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Little justification can be found for the continued application of the Georgia
rule. It is clearly contrary to the tenor of the great majority of judicial decisions
in the field, and several states have adopted statutes liberalizing the passage of
powers to successor trustees.x9 These decisions and statutes seem to be based
on the realization that the "normal" powers granted to a trustee are intended to
attach to the office,2° and that as a practical matter, a testator rarely desires the,
exercise of a power to be limited to the life or incumbency of one particular
trustee.2 ' The application of the minority rule may result in some added protec-
tion for the beneficiaries, but this protection is likely to be more than offset by
the more rapid depletion of the trust corpus because of the necessity for suc-
cessors to obtain court approval for their acts.
VIOLATION OF ILLINOIS ELECTION CODE AS
CIVIL CONTEMPT
Under a section of the Illinois election code, election judges and clerks are
made officers of the court and are liable "in a proceeding for contempt for any
misbehavior in their office, to be tried in open court on oral testimony in a sum-
mary way, without formal pleadings ..... " In the recent case of People ex rel.
Rusch v. Fusco,2 the state Supreme Court reaffirmed its original construction of
this provision that a proceeding under the statute is one for civil contempt and is
to be tried under applicable rules of civil procedure.
Those accused of violating the statute in question are usually charged with
falsifying election returns and/or acquiescing in the falsification of these returns.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions that offense, if committed by a court officer,
would be considered a criminal contempt. Most courts treat any contempt com-
mitted by an o~cer of the court, whether in the presence of the court or not, as
of a criminal nature unless the punishment is inflicted for the benefit of one of
the parties.3 Similarly, courts consider as criminal a contempt defined by a stat-
19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1937) § 26.74; Me. Rev. Stat. (i944) c. 147 § 6; Mass.
Ann. Laws (i933) c. 203 § 6; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 486 § 5; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943)
§ 231.28; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, x942) § 6298a; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1939)
Art. 7425b-4o.
20 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 553 (i935). 21 Ibid.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. 46, § 14-5.
274 N.E. 2d 531 (Ill., 1947).
3Butterfield v. Nebraska, i44 Neb. 388, 13 N.W. 2d 572 (1944); United States v. Ford;
9 F. 2d 990 (D.C. Mont., 1925); Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121, io6 S.W. 990 (i9o7); State v.
District Court, 5I Mont, 337, 152 Pac. 475 (19,5); cf. Howard v. Gulf C. & S.F.R. Co., 135
S.W. 707 (Tex. Civ. App., i911). The Illinois decisions are in accord with this rule except as
regards the election officials who are made officers of the court by the statute in question. In
re Kelly's Estate, 365 Ill. 174, 6 N.E. 2d 113 (1937); People v. Andalman,346 Ill. 149, 178
N.E. 412 (1932); People v. Seymour, 272 Ill. 295, iii N.E. ioo8 (1916).
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ute which stipulates punitive measures to be taken against contemnors. 4 The
general definition widely quoted is that a contempt is criminal which has the
primary effect of defying the authority of the court and for which punitive as
opposed to remedial measures are prescribed.5 Both of these characteristics ap-
ply to the Illinois statute in question.
The construction given the Illinois statute may be explained by the desire
of the courts to avoid a common law rule of ancient origin, still in effect in Illi-
nois, that in a proceeding to punish for a criminal contempt committed outside
the presence of the court a sworn answer under oath denying the alleged con-
tempt must be regarded as true and conclusive, and that thereafter the accused
is entitled to his discharge.6 Under this rule no witnesses are permitted to testify
once the accused has submitted his answer, and the only remedy for a false an-
swer is an indictment for perjury.7 The difficulty of obtaining a conviction under
a perjury charge is so great that the denial of the accused in the contempt action
will in many instances terminate all proceedings in the matter.8 In the first case
to come before the Illinois Supreme Court under the statute dealing with elec-
tion frauds, no attempt was made to discard or modify the common law rule.9
The court acknowledged, however, that if the defendants were to be permitted to
purge themselves by their sworn answers, the result would be to render the
court powerless to punish these officers for misbehavior. Thus, by retaining the
doctrine of compurgation, the court placed itself in a position where it was nec-
essary to regard the contempt as civil in order not to render the statute in-
effective.
4 Cannon v. State, 5 P. 2d 135 (Okla. Cr. Ct., 1936); Maxwell v. Rives, ii Nev. 213 (876).
The English courts have interpreted an early statute, Stat. of Westminster i (1275) § 29, 3
Edw. i, which imposed penalties on serjeants and other court pleaders who were convicted of
deceitful and collusive conduct before a court, as an enlargement of criminal contempt powers.
Fox, A History of Contempt of Court 156-64 (1927).
s Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Moscovitz, Contempt
of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Col. L. Rev. 780 (943).
6People v. Doss, 382 Ill. 307, 46 N.E. 2d 984 (1943); In re Kelly's Estate, 365 Ill. 174, 6
N.E. 2d 113 (1937); People v. Whitlow, 357 I. 34, 191 N.E. 222 (1934); People v. McLaugh-
lin, 334 Ill. 354, 166 N.E. 67 (1929); People v. McDonald, 314 Ill. 548, 145 N.E. 636 (1924).
In the Whitlow case, the accused assaulted an attorney a short distance from the courtroom
in the view of several witnesses. The trial court found the accused guilty of contempt. The
supreme court held that the lower court had erred in not permitting the defendant to be tried
solely on a sworn answer. The trial court in the McDonald case found that the accused had
assaulted a litigant. The supreme court ruled, however, that the accused was entitled to his
discharge since he had denied the charge under oath. The defendant in the McLaughlin case
was found guilty of threatening a witness, but was discharged by the Supreme Court on the
basis of his sworn denial. See 24 Ill. L. Rev. 598, noting the McLaughlin case.
7 People v. Doss, 382 Ill. 3o8, 46 N.E. 2d 984 (1943).
8 Compare Curtis and Curtis, The Story of a Notion in the Law of Criminal Contempt, 41
Harv. L. Rev. 55, 66 (1927). Justice Holmes termed the risk of conviction for a perjured answer
"slight." United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 575 (19o6); see McCintock, What Happens
to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727 (940).
9 People v. White, 334 Ill. 465, 166 N.E. 100 (1929).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Illinois and Indiana" are the only states which still retain the "compurga-
tion "rule in its entirety, although some forms of it still persist in other jurisdic-
tions." Other states have expressly rejected it either by statute12 or decision."3
The origin of the practice has been traced4 to a poorly reasoned decision of the
King's Bench in the late seventeenth century."5 It was repudiated in England
by 179616 but not before the American courts had taken it over.'7
Retention of the doctrine in Illinois has somewhat obliterated the dividing
line between criminal and civil contempt and has led to a classification which
differs in many respects from that in effect in jurisdictions not similarly ham-
pered.8 As in the instance of cases arising under the statute in question, the
Illinois courts have on other occasions classified contempts as civil which are re-
garded elsewhere as criminal, in order to avoid the nullifying effect of the "coin-
purgation" rule. 9 The result has been to subject to civil procedure contemnors
who in most other jurisdictions would be entitled to those safeguards which ac-
company a criminal contempt proceeding, the most important difference being
the amount of proof required for conviction. In a civil contempt trial, guilt need
10 State v. Fletcher Trust Co., 211 Ind. 27, 5 N.E. 2d 538 (1937); Denny v. State, 203 Ind.
682, 182 N.E. 313 (1932); Zuver v. State, 188 Ind. 6o, 12 N.E. 828 (I919).
11 North Carolina and Florida appear to have disregarded the rule in equity actions. In re
Parker, 177 N.C. 463, 99 S.E. 342 (1919); Ex parte Peaden, 88 Fla. 273, 102 So. i6o (1924).
They still retain it, however, in suits at law. In re Robinson, 117 N.C. 533, 23 S.E. 453 (1895);
Croft v. Culbreath, i5o Fla. 6o, 6 So. 2d 638 (1942). The Croft decision indicated that Florida
is still strongly committed to the rule in contempts that arise out of common law actions.
2 New Mexico Stat. Ann. (1941) § i6-io3; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § i3-6o9; Mich. Stat.
Ann. (1938) § 27.529.
'3 Van Dyke v. Superior Court, 24 Ariz. 5o8, 21i Pac. 576 (1922); State v. Kayser, 25
N.M. 245, 181 Pac. 278 (1919); Ex parte Bankhead, 2oo Ala. 102, 75 So. 478 (1917); O'Flynn
v. State, 89 Miss. 85o, 62 So. 902 (19o7); Huntington v. McMahon, 48 Conn. 174 (188o);
State v. Matthews, 37 N.H. 450 (1859). The federal courts discarded the rule in 'United
States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (Igo6), in which Justice Holmes denounced it as permitting trial
"simply by their oaths."
14 For general discussion and criticism of the rule see Curtis and Curtis, op. cit. supra note 8.
s Anon., Comb. 63 (i688).
16 Matter of Corssley, 6 T.R. 701 (1796).
7 Thomas's Lessee v. Cummins, i Yeates (Pa.) 4o (1791).
18 That the Illinois cases are at variance with the distinction set out in the Gompers case
was indicated in Rothschild & Co. v. Steger Piano Co., 256 Ill. 196, 99 N.E. 920 (1912). The
court pointed out that in fllinois it has been a practice to impose imprisonment for a definite
term in some civil contempts as well as in criminal contempts. Jurisdictions which follow
the Gompers rule impose imprisonment for a definite period only in criminal contempt cases.
The reasoning of the opinion suggests that in Illinois imprisonment for a specific term is im-
posed only in those civil contempts which would be regarded elsewhere as criminal contempts.
'9 While most courts almost invariably term a contempt of an injunction used to enforce
state liquor laws criminal, llinois regards it as acivilcontempt. Statev. Froelich, 3x6 Ill. 77,
146 N.E.-733 (1925). Illinois is also in the minority of states that treat the violation of a labor
injunction as a civil contempt. Flannery v. People, 225 Ill. 62, 8o N.E. 6o (19o7); O'Brien v.
People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N.E. xo8 (igo5). For a comparison of the Illinois rulings with those of
other states see Moscovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, op. cit. supra note 5
at 798-8oo, n. 86 and n. 88.
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only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence ;20 under criminal contempt
procedure the evidence must establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a
reasonable doubt.=
It might be said that the difference between proof by a preponderance of the
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not appreciable. However,
failure to conform to the latter standard in a criminal trial constitutes reversible
error whether the trial is held before a judge or jury.22 It would seem that a de-
fendant in what is fundamentally a criminal action is entitled to this protection
regardless of the label placed on the proceedings.
The Illinois legislature in enacting the statute in question has felt it necessary
to provide summary contempt punishment for an offense which would other-
wise be prosecuted under normal criminal procedure.23 It is unfortunate that the
Illinois court, because of its unwillingness to abandon an antiquated rule of con-
tempt procedure, has further deprived offenders of the safeguard embodied in
the reasonable doubt rule. It might well be considered whether the resulting
procedure is not so unfair to offenders under the statute as to amount to a de-
privation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.24
2 McBride v. People, 225 Il. 315, 8o N.E. 3o6 (19o7); Flannery v. People, 225 Ill. 62, 8o
N.E. 6o (x9o7); People v. Greenzeit, 277 fI1. App. 479 (1934)-
21 Compare 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed., i94o); People v. Spain, 307 Ill. 283, 138
N.E. 614 (1923); Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (i9ii). Another
difference between civil and criminal procedure is that an Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1927) c. 110, § 213, makes findings of fact by the appellate court in a civil case tried without
a jury binding on the supreme court. People ex rel. Rusch v. Fusco, 74 N.E. 2d 531 (Ill.,
1947). The presumption of innocence, whose importance lies largely in its impression on the
jury, is also present in a criminal trial, but would seem to be of little significance in a summary
proceeding. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2511 (3 d ed., i94o). The defendant in a criminal contempt
proceeding in Illinois probably has no privilege against self-incrimination. People v. Seymour,
191 Ill. App. 381 (i1q5), aff'd 272 Ill. 295, 111 N.E. loo8 (3916); O'Neil v. People, 113 Ill.
App. 195 (i9o3).
-9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed., i94o); see People v. Spain, 307 Ill. 283, 138 N.E.
614 (1923). It should be noted in this respect that the court in the Gompers case indicated that
misclassification of a criminal contempt as civil contempt by a federal court would be in
violation of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution. Gompers v. Bucks
Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (191).
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. 46, § 29-IS; see People v: Greenzeit, 277 Ill. App. 479,485 (1934).
24 See the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Murphy, concurred in by justices
Douglas and Rutledge, in Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 1683 (947), where they argue
that the protections embodied in the Bill of Rights amendments should be made applicable
to the states under the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The defendant under the Illinois election frauds statute is not given the benefit of an indict-
ment, trial by jury, or the privilege against self-incrimination. See note 21 supra. No one of
these deprivations, taken alone, amounts to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hur-
tado v. California, izo U.S. S16 (1884) (indictment by grand jury); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U.S. 90 (875) (trial by jury); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (i9o8) (privilege against
self-incrimination). Taken together, however, and combined with the failure to use the "reason-
able doubt" test, there may be such a clear departure from orthodox criminal practice as to be
a violation of the amendment. Thus, while it has been held that there is no absolute right to
representation by counsel in a criminal case, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (94i), there may
be circumstances under which a denial of such counsel results in such unfairness as to be a
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
52 (1932).
